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Between 2001 and 2010, U.S. trade in goods with Latin America grew at an unprecedented 7.04% 
per year. However, during these years, mostly as a consequence of the rapid growth of trade 
between China and Latin America, the relative importance of the U.S. as a trading partner of 
Latin America declined significantly. Projections indicate that, although trade between the U.S. 
and Latin America will grow, this decline is very likely to continue, thereby contributing to the 
erosion of U.S. influence on this region of the world. 
 





uring the period 2001-2010, U.S. trade in goods with Latin America grew at an annual average rate of 
7.04%, from $345.3 billion in 2001 to $636.7 billion in 2010. This rate was double the average rate 
of growth of Latin America’s GDP and one percentage point higher than the average rate of growth 
of total U.S. trade in goods between 2001 and 2010. Nonetheless, the proportion of U.S. goods in Latin American 
imports went from 44% in 2001 to 35.7% in 2010, while the proportion of Latin American exports that went to the 
U.S. dropped from 56% in 2001 to barely over 40% in 2010. Additionally, the U.S. trade deficit with Latin America 
went from $39.5 billion in 2001 to $64.5 billion in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011, and Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC], 2010).Thus, even though trade in goods between the U.S. and Latin 
America grew at an unprecedented high rate between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. trade deficit with this region 
increased at the same time that the relative importance of the U.S. as a trading partner of Latin America declined. 
 
This decline was primarily caused by the large increase in China-Latin America trade. China’s trade with 
Latin America did not, however, displace in a significant way trade between the U.S. and Latin America. Such 
displacement did not occur because China’s exports to Latin America were dominated by goods that, for decades, 
have not been produced in significant quantities in the U.S, while China’s imports from Latin American have been 
dominated by primary goods, which the Latin nations were able to produce in sufficient quantities to easily satisfy 
the demands from local and international markets (Kay and Canavire-Bacarreza, 2011). 
 
 As the U.S. economy continues recovering, U.S. imports from Latin America are likely to continue 
growing. There are, however, two factors that are very likely to render such potential growth insufficient to stop the 
decline of the relative importance of the U.S. as importer of Latin American goods. These are:  1) a projected growth 
of China's GDP that is 2.5 to 4.5 percentage points higher than the projected growth of the GDP of the U.S. and 2) 
the very limited capacity of the Latin countries to produce the kind of high-income goods that are demanded by the 
U.S. economy (Kay and Canavire-Bacarreza, 2011; U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2011; and ECLAC, 
2010).  
  
 As exporter of goods to Latin America, the U.S. has good prospects of reversing the decline of its relative 
importance as long as the Latin American nations continue adopting polices that promote growth. These prospects 
may, however, be limited, or even eliminated, by factors such as the growing presence of goods from Europe and 
Japan in Latin American markets and the disdain of Latin America across U.S. society (Eurostat, 2011, and Coelen, 
1998). 
D 
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 In the past, the U.S. considered Latin America as its backyard, where its political and economic influence 
was easily exercised through a variety of channels, one being, of course, trade in goods. Hence, as the relative 
importance of the U.S. as a trading partner of Latin America declines, this influence will erode (Hornbeck, 2010). 
Such erosion, however, is likely to be marginal in the nations that send a large number of immigrants to the U.S, 
such as Mexico, Colombia and most of the Central American nations; but in the other Latin nations, where U.S. 
influence is already diminishing, this erosion is likely to be significant. 
 
 The next two sections discuss the 2001-2010 trends and prospects for the near future of U.S. imports from 
and exports to Latin America, respectively, followed by a discussion dealing with potential implications of the 
projected decline in the relative importance of the U.S. as a trading partner of Latin America, and lastly, 
conclusions. 
 
IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
 
U.S. imports of goods from Latin America grew between 2001 and 2010 at a yearly average rate of 6.7% -
from $192.4 billion in 2001 to $350.6 billion in 2010. All 19 nations of Latin America participated in this high and 
unprecedented growth which meant that by 2010, every single Latin American country was exporting more to the 
U.S. than in 2001 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).  
 
 Yet, between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. ceased to be the largest buyer or importer of goods from an 
increasing number of Latin nations. In 2001, the U.S. was not the main buyer or importer for Argentina, Cuba, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. By 2010, this group was joined by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Panama; that is, between 2001 
and 2010, the number of Latin countries for which the U.S. was not the main importer of their goods went from four 
to eight (ECLAC 2010).  
 
Along with the increase in the number of Latin nations for which the U.S. was not the number one importer 
came the reduction in the percentage or share of Latin American exports that went to the U.S. This percentage 
progressively declined between 2001 and 2010 - from 56% to 39.5% (ECLAC, 2010). Thus, despite the 6.7% annual 
growth rate of U.S. imports from Latin America during the period 2001-2010, the relative importance of the U.S. as 
importer of Latin American goods underwent a steady and marked decline. 
 
The main cause of this decline was the fast increase of Latin American exports to China. These exports 
grew 32.5% per year during this period - from $5.4 billion dollars in 2001 to at least $68.7billion in 2010. Due to 
this high growth, China went from being (in 2001) an importer of very marginal importance for the Latin American 
nations to being (in 2010) the number one importer for Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Peru, and the number two importer 
for Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela. Also as a result of the high growth of their exports to China, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Peru were - of all the 19 Latin American nations - the first ones to recover from the recession that 
afflicted many countries between 2007 and 2009 (Kay and Canaveri-Bacarreza, 2011; and Central Intelligence 
Agency [CIA], 2011) 
 
 China's imports from Latin America grew so much during the period 2001-2010 because China's economy 
grew at an annual rate of 10.2% during these years (Kay and Canaveri-Bacarreza, 2011). Thus, if the direct 
correlation between the growth of China's economy and its imports from Latin American continues, the projected 
five to seven percent yearly growth of China's GDP for the 2012-2016 period should result in a significant reduction 
of the rate of growth of Latin American exports to China. Very likely, this reduction may not, however, be enough 
to allow the U.S. to reverse - or at least to stop - the decline of its relative importance as importer of Latin American 
goods. Two obstacles preclude such a reversal. 
 
 The first of these obstacles is the slow - current and projected - growth of the U.S. economy.  In 2011, the 
U.S. economy grew less than two percent and for the period 2012-2017, the U.S. economy is projected to expand at 
no more than 2.5 percent per year (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011). Therefore, the U.S. economy is growing 
and is expected to grow at rates that are no more than one-half of the projected rates of China's growth in economy. 
Such differential practically guarantees that the rate of growth of imports from Latin America is bound to be 
significantly smaller for the U.S. than for China for the next four years.  
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 The second of these obstacles is the limited capacity of Latin America to produce high-income goods. This 
limitation is indicated by the dominance of Mexico in the exports of these products to the U.S.  Between 2001 and 
2010, Latin American exports to China were almost exclusively primary goods; while manufactured goods were, on 
average, 60% of the Latin American exports to the U.S. Of this 60%, however, at least 90% consisted of cars, 
complex chemical inputs, high-tech electronics, components of high-tech machinery, and other high-income goods 
made or assembled in Mexico (Kay and Canaveri-Bacrreza, 2011, and Banco de Mexico, 2011). 
 
 These exports were assembled or manufactured in the industrial plants of Mexico's export-of-manufactures 
sector. The vast majority of these plants belong to companies from the U.S., some belong to European, Japanese and 
Korean companies, and very few belong to Indian and Chinese companies. These companies established production 
and assembling plants in Mexico to take advantage of the country's abundant cheap labor, proximity to U.S. 
markets, and the legal structure provided by the North American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA - which greatly 
facilitates U.S.-Mexico trade. Of these three advantages, proximity to U.S. markets is unique to Mexico; which 
basically rules out the possibility that another Latin American country will develop an export-of-manufactures sector 
similar to the one that Mexico has developed. Hence, as the U.S. economy grows, the exports of manufactures of 
Latin America to the U.S. are likely to grow; but such growth will be constrained by how economically convenient it 
is for companies from the U.S, Europe, Japan, India and China - that export to the U.S. - to manufacture and/or 
assemble some of these exports in Mexico   
 
EXPORTS OF U.S. GOODS TO LATIN AMERICA 
 
Exports of U.S. goods to Latin America grew between 2001 and 2010 at an annual rate of 7.2% - from 
$152.9 billion to $286.1 billion. For the same period, Latin America's GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.5 %. These 
figures indicate that U.S. exports to Latin America grew at a vigorous pace during these years. Such vigorous 
growth was, however, accompanied by a decline in the share or percentage of U.S. goods in Latin American 
imports. In 2001, U.S. exports to Latin America represented 44% of the goods that Latin America imported; but by 
2010, the percentage of U.S. goods in Latin American imports had declined to 34% (ECLAC, 2010; CIA, 2011; and 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2011) 
 
 The main cause of the relative decline of the U.S. as exporter of goods to Latin America was the rapid 
growth of exports from China to these nations, especially to Brazil and Mexico. Chinese exports to this region grew 
from less than $2 billion in 2001 to at least $85.3 billion in 2010. That is, between 2001 and 2010, China's exports to 
Latin America went from representing 0.57% to representing 10.2% of Latin American imports (Kay and Canaveri-
Bacarreza, 2011, and CIA, 2011). 
 
 The rapid growth of Chinese exports to Latin America may have displaced few U.S. products, like solar 
panels, from Latin American markets. However, such displacement - if it occurred - was quite marginal since the 
majority of Chinese exports to Latin America consisted of plastic toys, inexpensive shoes, mechanical tools, cheap 
textiles, cell-phones, and low-tech industrial machinery, which are goods that have not been manufactured in the 
U.S. in several decades. 
 
 A second important contributor to the relative decline of the U.S. as exporter to Latin America was the 
direct dependence of U.S. exports of intermediate goods from U.S. economic growth. This dependence was, and 
continuous to be, through Mexico's export-of-manufactures sector which, as already mentioned, uses imported 
intermediary goods to assemble and manufacture appliances, cars, complex chemical inputs, and other high-income 
goods that are exported back to the U.S. In 2001, this sector received, according to figures from Mexico's central 
bank, approximately 85% of the U.S. exports to Mexico, which represented close to 25% of all Latin American 
imports. As the U.S.'s GDP grew at an average of 5.4% per year between 2001 and 2006, U.S. exports of 
intermediary goods to Mexico grew 5.7% per year; but as the rate of expansion of the U.S.'s GDP declined to an 
average of 1.4% between 2007 and 2010, the yearly growth of U.S. exports of intermediary declined to 5% per year. 
Thus, by 2010, U.S. exports of intermediary goods represented 16% of all Latin American imports (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2011, and Banco de Mexico, 2011).  
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 The third possible major cause of the relative decline of the U.S. as exporter to Latin America was what 
may be called a good, albeit insufficient, response of U.S. exports of finished goods to the positive economic 
developments that took place across most of Latin America during the period 2001-2010. Between 2001 and 2010, 
as mentioned above, Latin America's GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.5%. At the same time, with the exception of 
Cuba and Venezuela, the Latin nations reduced - slowly but steadily - their tariffs and other protectionist measures. 
As a result of these positive economic developments, U.S. exports of consumer and capital goods to Latin America 
expanded 9.16 % per year - from $66.8 billion in 2001 to $147.1 billion in 2010. Yet, between 2001 and 2010, the 
percentage of Latin American imports that corresponded to U.S. finished goods still declined - from 19.2% to 17.6% 
(Banco de Mexico, 2011, and U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)  
 
 Given the economic progress that most Latin nations experienced between 2001 and 2010, it is very likely 
that - aside from Venezuela and Cuba - these nations will continue implementing economic policies that keep 
inflation at very low levels, reduce public deficits, gradually - but steadily - open the economy and increase the 
efficiency of their infrastructures (Hornbeck, 2010). The continued implementation of these types of policies may 
not cause Latin America's GDP to grow at 3.5% or Latin imports to grow at 10.2% per year as they did during the 
2001-2010 period. However, these policies are very likely to continue generating the expansion of the demands for 
capital goods and for high-income consumer goods in these nations. This means that U.S. exports of high-income 
and capital goods to Latin America have the opportunity to grow at high rates since these kinds of goods are 
produced in the U.S. at competitive prices.   
 
 This optimistic outlook faces, however, some serious obstacles. The first is competition from European and 
Japanese luxury products. Expensive Japanese cars and electronics, as well as all kinds of high-income European 
goods, are already easy to find in Latin American countries. In fact, between 2003 and 2010, European goods 
maintained their 15% share in Latin American imports (Eurostat, 2011). Hence, as the economies of the Latin 
countries grow, Japanese and European producers of high-income goods will try to increase their presence in the 
consumer and producer markets of these countries. This means that competition will be awaiting the U.S. producers 
of luxury goods who decide to enter Latin American. 
 
 A second obstacle is the tariffs that Argentina and Brazil continue to impose on U.S goods. Brazil and 
Argentina have the first and third largest economies, respectively, of Latin America. They generate between 42% 
and 45% of the GDP of Latin America and no less than 65% of the GDP of South America. Therefore, these tariffs, 
albeit quite small, are reducing the potential demands for U.S. goods in the largest consumer and producer markets 
of South America. These tariffs could be eliminated if the U.S. government were willing to eliminate its domestic 
agricultural subsidies, since this is what Brazil and Argentina have requested in order to start negotiating a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. (Hornbeck, 2010). However, given that such subsidies constitute a delicate political issue, it 
is unlikely that U.S. products will gain duty-free entrance - any time soon - to the largest markets of South America. 
 
 A third obstacle to the rapid growth of U.S. exports of goods to Latin America is the disdain of Latin 
America across U.S. society (Coelen, 1998). This disdain not only deters potential U.S. exporters from entering 
Latin American markets, but since it is well known in Latin countries, this disdain also adds obstacles to the U.S. 
exporters that are already doing business in Latin America. 
 
IMPLICATION FOR THE U.S.:  EROSION OF INFLUENCE 
 
For decades the U.S. has been the country with the most economic and political influence on Latin 
America. Given this background, it seems reasonable to expect that as the decline in the relative importance of the 
U.S. as trading partner of Latin America continues, the governments of the Latin nations are likely to give more 
weight to their political convictions and economic interests than to the need to avoid conflicts with the U.S. in their 
decisions to support, oppose, or ignore U.S. international initiatives. That is, as the U.S. has become a less important 
trading partner of Latin America, it seems reasonable to expect some erosion of the influence that the U.S. has had 
across Latin America. This reasoning - although appealing - is not, as argued below, entirely correct. 
 
 As already mentioned, there are 19 countries in Latin America. One of these nations – Cuba - has very little 
relevance in international trade affairs because it has an economy that is practically closed. Of the other 18 Latin 
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American nations, 11 have signed free trade treaties with the U.S. (U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 2012).  In 
alphabetical order, they are Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. These treaties have been criticized - for a variety of reasons - in each 
one of these 11 Latin nations and in the U.S. Nonetheless, these treaties preclude - or at least minimize - the 
possibility of trade sanctions imposed as a consequence of disagreements about non-trade issues. Despite this 
protection, the following countries still have to be rather cautious in their reactions to international initiatives of the 
U.S.:  Colombia, Mexico, and the members of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement - 
the CAFTA - signed in 2008; namely, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Dominican 
Republic.  
 
 Two factors are the cause of this extra caution. First, all of these nations are still very dependent from the 
U.S. for their exports and imports since at least 70% of their total trade continues to be with the U.S. Second, with 
the exception of Costa Rica, these nations have sent - and continue to send - large numbers of illegal immigrants to 
the U.S., and although the deportation of all of these immigrants is very unlikely, enough of them could be deported 
to greatly aggravate the unemployment problems in their respective home countries. Additionally, for Colombia and 
Mexico, the illegal drug trade that afflicts these nations imposes a solid constraint to their responses to international 
initiatives of the U.S. Hence, of the 11 nations that have signed a free trade agreement with the U.S., the only 
countries where the political and economic influence of the U.S. may have been eroded in the last ten years are 
Chile, Panama, and Peru. 
 
 This erosion, however, has been noticeable in the seven Latin countries that have decided not to sign free 
trade agreements with the U.S. Of these nations, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have exchanged hostile rhetoric 
with the U.S. and have also taken actions that go against the political and economic interests of the U.S.  Of these 
actions the most noticeable have been those taken by Venezuela, which include establishing a political alliance with 
Iran, buying weapons from Belarus, criticizing any Latin American country that cooperates with the U.S., and 
forming the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas – ALBA - which is an organization that has the explicit goal of 
opposing the Free Trade Area of the Americas - the FTAA - proposed by the U.S (Hornbeck, 2010).   
 
 The anti-U.S. behavior of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador began in 1999, 2006, and 2007, respectively, 
which were the years when Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador were 
elected presidents of their respective countries. Since they were presidential candidates, Correa - but especially 
Morales and Chavez - have openly expressed their socialist convictions and their opposition to international 
initiatives of the U.S. that were, from their perspective, contrary to their ideologies. Within Venezuela, Chavez has 
shown his socialist convictions by greatly increasing the role of the government at the expense of the private sector 
(CIA, 2011). This background suggests that the political ideology of Presidents Chavez, Morales, and Correa rather 
than less trade, in percentage terms, with the U.S. is what has caused the erosion of U.S. influence in these three 
nations.  
 
 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay - the four original members of the Mercosur customs union - are 
the other South American nations that do not have a free trade agreement with the U.S. These nations, under the 
leadership of Brazil, have made it clear that as long as the U.S. government refuses to eliminate its domestic 
agricultural subsidies, they will not support trade initiatives of the U.S., like the Free Trade Areas of the Americas - 
the FTAA.  The opposition of Brazil and Argentina to U.S. trade initiatives has coincided with the drastic growth in 
trade between these nations and China, the EU, and other Latin American nations. In fact, China has become Brazil's 
main trading partner and Argentina's second importer (Kay and Canaveri-Bacarreza, 2011). The opposition to U.S 
trade initiatives has not, however, been accompanied by anti-U.S. rhetoric from the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, or Uruguay, nor have any of these four nations entered into political alliances with Iran or with any other 
country that is openly hostile to the U.S. These arguments suggest that the opposition of Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay to the trade initiatives of the U.S. is based upon economic rather than ideological reasons. 
Hence, for these four nations, the decline - in percentage terms - of their trade in goods with the U.S. may have 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The expected slow growth of the U.S. economy and, most importantly, the very limited capacity of Latin 
America to manufacture high-income goods will preclude the fast growth of U.S. imports from this region. Thus, the 
percentage of Latin American exports that go to the U.S. should continue declining. 
 
 The percentage of U.S. products, U.S. exports, in Latin American imports is also expected to continue its 
decline. This decline, however, not only can be avoided, but it can actually be reversed if the U.S. government and 
potential U.S. exporters actively promote U.S. exports to Latin America. This may also help to reduce the trade 
deficit with Latin America and the excess capacity that afflicts the U.S. economy. Promoting the rapid growth of 
U.S. exports to Latin America is not, however, an easy task since it requires removing the negative image that Latin 
America has across U.S. society. 
 
 The decline of the relative importance of the U.S. as a trading partner of Latin America has contributed to 
the erosion of U.S. influence in this region. Thus, such erosion will increase if the relative importance of the U.S. as 
a trading partner of Latin America continues declining. This does not imply that English will be displaced as the 
foreign language that is taught in the schools in Latin America; nor does it imply that Latin American students that 
would have come to the U.S. to obtain an advance degree will be going to China or Europe to obtain that degree.  
What this decline implies is that the U.S government cannot take for granted, as in decades past, the support of the 
Latin American nations of its international initiatives. This decline also implies that among consumers, producers 
and government agencies, from Mexico to Argentina, there is full awareness that the U.S. is neither the sole buyer of 
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